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As new technologies are introduced to the health care space, 
such as electronic health records and mobile health applications, there 
exists a need to address privacy challenges related to new methods of 
information exchange. Current legal and moral understandings of 
privacy are insufficient to address the challenges of information 
privacy. This paper seeks to develop a deliberative framework that allows 
health policy makers to analyze privacy concerns when introducing or reviewing 
new technologies or initiatives in order to better protect the values of the 
American people. In doing so, I review moral and legal perspectives of privacy, 
arguing that these accounts: (1) fail to incorporate situational context and (2) 
assume that privacy is always a positive value, and thus, worth protecting at the 
expense of other goods. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As new technologies are introduced to the health care space, there exists a 
need to address privacy challenges related to new methods of information 
exchange, such as the exchange of electronic health records and the use 
of mobile health applications. Current legal and moral 
understandings of privacy are insufficient to address the challenges 
of information privacy. This paper seeks to develop a deliberative framework 
that allows health policy makers to analyze privacy concerns when introducing 
or reviewing new technologies or initiatives in order to better protect the values 
of the American people. In doing so, I review moral and legal accounts of 
privacy, and through the exploration of two case studies, argue that these 
accounts: (1) fail to incorporate situational context and (2) assume that privacy is 
always a positive value, and thus, worth protecting at the expense of other 
goods.  
By appropriately identifying concerns related to new technologies or 
initiatives, policy makers are poised to predict acceptable trade-offs to privacy. 
Trade-offs are driven by (1) circumstance, (2) comfort and ease, and (3) 
expectation, because society has adopted new methods of conducting old 
activities. Privacy is a value that is sometimes trumped by other values in the 
form of trade-offs. If policy makers can better predict the tensions that require 
consideration in the context of these trade-offs, they are better positioned to 
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develop more effective policies that accomplish goals without unduly burdening 
members of society.  
PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES 
For any given definition of privacy, there exist circumstances for which 
definitions are inadequate. For example, in its better-known iteration, privacy 
has been defined as the “right to be let alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890); 
however, critics have argued that this definition is limited in scope. For instance, 
information about someone can be spread without his or her awareness, so 
perhaps privacy also includes the ability to control information about oneself. 
Moreover, there are situations that require active engagement of the person, such 
as in the sharing of electronic health records with appropriate parties; simply 
leaving someone alone will not solve all privacy challenges in an ever-changing 
socioeconomic landscape.  
Privacy has been described as possessing a chameleon-like quality, 
adapting to circumstances as they arise (BeVier, 1995). “Perhaps the most striking 
thing about the right to privacy,” Judith Jarvis Thompson suggests, “is that 
nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is” (Thomson, 1975). There 
exist numerous definitions of privacy out of a necessity to capture the many 
circumstances that present challenges to privacy. A single definition of privacy 
may be common to a discipline or field, but that definition may become 
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inadequate outside the scope of its original context. For instance, privacy defined 
as noninterference does not help us grapple with the challenges of sharing 
personal health information with people other than our physicians; rather, we 
can turn to privacy defined as the control of personal information to address 
potential concerns that arise from sharing health information. As new situations 
arise, our understanding of privacy must evolve as well. We cannot simply rely 
on existing accounts of privacy to address new challenges. Even the token 
metaphor for discussing the importance of information privacy falls short. In 
George Orwell’s 1984, Big Brother is a metaphor for totalitarian government 
surveillance; however, this literary portrayal of a world with no privacy does not 
adequately capture concerns related to the storage of personal data in large 
databases. Below, I will discuss a few moral and legal conceptions of privacy and 
their limitations. Before doing so, I will discuss the value of information privacy 
in particular. 
The Value of Information Privacy 
Although the concept of privacy is not straightforward, privacy itself is 
valuable and worth protecting. In most cases, protecting privacy put limits on 
power, increases individual autonomy, builds trust in relationships, and protects 
rights. Jeroen van den Hoven offers the most comprehensive normative view of 
information privacy by sorting moral reasons to protect privacy into four 
categories: (1) information-based harm, (2) informational inequality, (3) 
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informational justice, and (4) encroachment on moral autonomy (Van den 
Hoven, 2001).  He arrives at these categories “by asking what gives moral 
legitimacy to public policy that would restrict the collection, retrieval, and 
dissemination of data […] because it furthers moral ends, prevents harms, and 
promotes equality, justice, and autonomy” (Van den Hoven, 2001). In the interest 
of simplicity, I will briefly discuss the first two categories because they are the 
most relevant to the case studies explored in this paper.   
Information-based harms can result from access to information available 
through public government records. For example, before the Driver's Privacy 
Protection Act (DPPA) of 1994, which restricted the disclosure of personal 
information, anti-abortion activists would harass abortion providers and patients 
through the use of public driving license databases (Hammitt, 1997). In this 
instance, policy makers restricted the retrieval of personal information from 
driver’s records for the purposes of preventing harm.  
Informational inequality results when shared information 
disproportionately benefits some people, but not others (Van den Hoven, 2001). 
In the age of data aggregation and data mining, individuals are not equipped 
with the same tools and access to their public information as companies are, thus 
creating an imbalance of power. Companies have more leverage over 
individuals, simply because they have the resources to accrue and analyze 
information. A possible solution to this disparity is to democratize databases, 
which ultimately allows for more transparency, though this solution must be 
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weighed against potential negative outcomes of democratized databases, such as 
in the DPPA case. A more narrow approach would be to allow individuals to 
access only their own records. Individuals can view and correct information 
about themselves, and thus have more control over their information.  
Unlike the DPPA case, information gleaned from these databases is novel 
in the way it is aggregated; people are not accruing data about themselves in the 
way that companies do. Because companies are able to aggregate data in a 
sophisticated way, they know more about an individual’s online habits than the 
individuals themselves. The disparity in knowledge between companies and the 
individual means that companies can use information about an individual’s 
habits to subconsciously manipulate them into buying goods or clicking on 
certain articles. For example, consider the noticeable rise in fake news 
throughout and after the 2016 United States presidential election. 1 Although it is 
impossible to confirm whether fake news stories generated by websites or 
hackers influenced the results on the election, Facebook has taken measures to 
combat fake news by fact-checking headlines through third-party sources such as 
Politifact, The Associated Press, and Snopes (Ortutay, 2016). Rather than simply 
filtering out fake news, Facebook has flagged disputed news for its users so that 
they are aware of which news is unverified and likely fake. Because users are 
now equipped with more information than was previously available to them, 
                                                        
1 Fake news is news that is unverified or false.  
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they can decide for themselves whether or not they want to click on a news 
article.2  
Some scholars argue for the existence of a right to privacy, whereas others 
deny it (Schoeman, 1984). Others claim that privacy is merely derivative of other 
rights.  Judith Jarvis Thomson most famously argues for the latter point, stating: 
“I don’t have a right to not be looked at because I have a right to privacy; I don’t 
have a right that no one should torture me in order to get personal information 
about me because I have a right to privacy; one is inclined, rather, to say that it is 
because I have these rights that I have a right to privacy” (Thomson, 1975). For 
Thomson, privacy is derivative in its importance; I agree with her claim.  Rights 
to privacy can be expressed more clearly through invoking liberty rights, 
property rights, or any other more fundamental rights.  The wrongness of 
violations of privacy can be explained through the existence of other rights, 
without ever invoking privacy.  For example, if a man is tortured for personal 
information, his right not to be tortured has been violated.  If a woman’s 
pornographic picture is stolen from her safe, her right to her property has been 
violated. Thomson explains that other rights already protect the consequences 
that a right to privacy tries to protect.  To invoke privacy adds nothing to the 
argument to protect a man from torture.  He should be protected because he has 
a right to not be tortured, not because he has a right to privacy.  Regarding 
                                                        
2 Fake news is targeted and is usually the result of past browsing history. Fake news amplifies 
potentially false beliefs held by individuals by consistently reinforcing these beliefs through the 
spread of false information (Ortutay, 2016). 
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information, Thomson argues that we have not violated someone’s right to 
privacy by knowing something about him or her. Rather, she states: “We have a 
right that certain steps shall not be taken to find out facts, and we have a right 
that certain uses shall not be made of facts” (Thomson, 1975). Improper 
dissemination of an electronic health record should be prevented, not because 
the patient has a right to privacy, but because patients have a right that their 
health data shall not be used for purposes outside of what was intended when it 
was collected; providers must ask for consent in order to disseminate patient 
health information, even if the medical institution owns the data found in the 
electronic health record.    
Accounts of Privacy and Their Limitations 
Privacy is most commonly discussed in the context of harms (Calo, 2011). 
A harm has occurred when an individual is worse off than they were before an 
action took place. For example, if your physician shares your health information 
with insurers and, as a result of that exchange, your insurance premiums rise, 
you have been harmed. You are worse off because your insurance has gotten 
more expensive. Not all cases of privacy violations result in harms, however. A 
wrong is a violation of a right. Perhaps the most popular understanding of a 
privacy violation is the case of the Peeping Tom. In the original tale, Tom “stole a 
look at Lady Godiva as she rode naked through the streets as a condition that her 
8 
 
husband, the king, would cease to impose backbreaking taxes on the town” 
(Calo, 2011). Tom was subsequently blinded for peeking.   
A Peeping Tom, or voyeur, refers to someone who seeks sexual 
gratification through spying on people. For example, they may peek into 
windows or through webcams to watch unsuspecting people undress or engage 
in sexual acts. Even if the Peeping Tom’s activity goes unnoticed, the 
observations acquired during his peeping are not disseminated, and the person 
has not been made worse off than they were before the action took place, the 
person who is being spied on is wronged because a right has been violated. 
According to Thomson, knowing something about someone is not a violation of 
their right to privacy; however, seeking that information by means of spying on 
them is a violation of that person’s right that certain methods should not be 
undertaken to find out facts about them.  
The Peeping Tom case does not help us work through all information 
privacy cases since there may not be a dissemination of private information 
beyond the Peeping Tom. As discussed earlier, the cornerstone of information 
privacy discussions is the dissemination of information. In his seminal work, 
legal scholar Daniel Solove discusses two metaphors for privacy, in particular, 
focusing on information privacy. Big Brother is always watching in George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. Orwell’s story describes a totalitarian state that is 
ruled by Big Brother, a “monolithic power engaged in massive surveillance” 
(Calo, 2011). It is the token metaphor for discussing information privacy.  
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While useful for discussing the consequences of surveillance, the Big 
Brother metaphor falls short when exploring other aspects of information, such 
as storing electronic health information in databases. As a solution, Solove 
proposes that Kafka’s The Trial be used as a metaphor to discuss database 
concerns.  Briefly, The Trial tells the story of Joseph K., who is inexplicably 
arrested one morning.  He does not know why he has been arrested, and more 
troubling, the officers that inform him of his arrest do not know either.  In its 
purest sense, the epistemic plight of Joseph K. is a harm. It is important to note 
that a harm or wrong need not be tied to a human actor, but instead can be 
committed through automated decision making (Calo, 2011). According to 
Solove, “The Trial captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and 
vulnerability one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has control 
over a vast dossier of details about one's life. At any time, something could 
happen to Joseph K.; decisions are made based on his data, and Joseph K. has no 
say, no knowledge, and no ability to fight back” (Solove D. , 2001). Structural 
harms and wrongs can be committed, and even if not individually felt, can 
collectively weaken social cohesion, trust, transparency, and other values society 
may find important.  
 The potential for structural harms and wrongs increases with rapid 
technological advancements in health. One such example, which I will discuss 
later, is the Precision Medicine Initiative, which seeks to aggregate the health 
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data of one million participants in order to create a representative registry of 
Americans that can be studied by researchers.  
Legal History of Privacy 
At least since the 18th Century, Western conceptions of privacy have 
changed, and much of this change has been driven through United States case 
law.3 Privacy is not explicitly protected in the Constitution of the United States, 
which was signed in 1787 and amended most recently in 1992. In all the years 
that the Constitution has been the highest law of the land, a beacon of American 
values, and the protector of liberties, not once has it been amended to explicitly 
protect privacy. James Madison penned the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution, named the Bill of Rights, in order to expand constitutional 
protections for State and individual liberties. These amendments limited the 
Federal Government’s power to intrude upon certain liberties, granting such 
legal protections as freedom of religion, freedom to assemble peacefully, the 
right to bear arms, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom from 
double jeopardy, and a right to a fair trial. The aforementioned list is not 
exhaustive, a fact that is captured by the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution: 
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people” (U.S. Const. amend. IX). That is 
                                                        
3 For the purposes of this paper, I have narrowed the scope of this discussion to Western conceptions 
of privacy. Even within Western literature, discussions of privacy are nuanced and diverse; I would 
not be able to satisfactorily engage with non-Western conceptions of privacy, though they exist. 
Despite this limitation, my deliberative framework takes into account the context in which privacy is 
situated and, thus, can also be used in non-Western policy making.  
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to say, while privacy protections may not be explicitly written in the 
Constitution, people may still have a right to privacy. The Supreme Court has 
upheld rulings to protect privacy, however, citing the penumbra, or shadowy 
spaces, of the Constitution in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and 
later the Due Process Clause, drawn from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution.  
Griswold v. Connecticut overturned a state law that criminalized the use 
of contraceptives within a marriage, ruling that such a law violated the right to 
marital privacy. Justice William Douglas wrote the majority opinion, writing that 
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by the 
emanations from those guarantees that give them life and substance,” Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). From these guarantees, Justice Douglas 
argues, there are zones of privacy, such as marital privacy, that should not be 
intruded upon by the courts. Justice Black and Justice Stewart wrote the 
dissenting opinion, arguing that the right to privacy does not exist because it is 
not written in the Constitution, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) 
(Black and Steward, J.J., dissenting). Justice Black states: “I like my privacy as 
well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government 
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional 
provision” 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Black and Steward, J.J., dissenting). 
Justice Goldberg wrote the concurring opinion, drawing from a different 
justification but agreeing with the Court’s opinion, stating: “To hold that a right 
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so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of 
privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so 
many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the 
Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever,” Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). As previously explained, the 
Ninth Amendment states that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” 
(U.S. Const. amend. IX). In summary, Justice Goldberg’s argument is that just 
because the right to marital privacy is not spelled out in the Constitution, does 
not mean that such a right is not held by the people. While Justice Goldberg’s 
argument is not a popular defense of privacy to this day, he does point to a 
moral right to privacy, one that is deeply entrenched in society, if not in law. 
Here, there is a clear distinction between legal rights and moral rights. Justice 
Goldberg is pointing to what he believes is a moral right, a right to marital 
privacy, that he believes should be protected, even when it is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution.  
Griswold v. Connecticut was a hallmark case that set the precedent for 
privacy being invoked in cases of sex and reproduction. For example, the right to 
possess birth control for married couples was extended to unmarried couples in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) due to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. The Court stated: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
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governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child,” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 
(1972). Subsequently, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) extended the right to 
privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include 
a woman’s decision to have an abortion. Finally, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003), a law prohibiting same-sex sexual contact was overturned, with the 
Court again citing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice 
O’Connor wrote the concurring opinion, stating that the Texas law touches 
“upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private 
of places, the home,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). Griswold v. Connecticut was even cited in the recent ruling 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), making same sex marriage legal across 
the United States.  
So far, none of the aforementioned court cases have been overturned. 
Constitutional purists will continue to argue that the right to privacy does not 
exist because it is not written in the Constitution, only erroneously inferred. 
Upon reviewing these cases, it seems that the constitutionally recognized right to 
privacy is protection from governmental intrusion into private spaces. That is, 
these rulings have pointed to public and private spaces, a dichotomy that is 
prominent in legal discourse (Nissenbaum, 2009). According to Nissenbaum, 
“[t]here seems to be general agreement […] that although the terms private and 
public vary in meaning from one arena to another […], they invariably 
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demarcate a strict dichotomy” (Nissenbaum, 2009). Private space is intimate and 
personal, typically referring to the home, while public space is beyond the home 
where people can come together to discuss civics, such as in Habermas’s 
Öffentlichkeit, or “public sphere” (Habermas, 1989). What is done in public can be 
controlled to a degree based on the interests and values society, but what is done 
in private, or in the home, should only concern those parties involved. It is this 
public/private dichotomy that has historically driven conversations related to 
privacy. What is done in public can be openly critiqued and constrained, as 
public space is shared by all members of society and should reflect the values of 
that society as a whole.  What is done in private, however, is up to the 
individual, since they do not share this space with anyone but themselves and 
whomever they invite inside. This familiar dichotomy has evolved due to the 
emergence and dominance of the Internet. There now exists a prominent public 
space that is accessed from the private and stores private information. This new 
dimension bridges the gap between the private and the public, facilitating the 
flow of information between spheres. Since information privacy concerns largely 
center around the flow of information, it is particularly important to consider this 
dimension when developing policies that seek to protect information that is 
shared.  
I will conclude this section on the legal history of privacy, which is in no 
way exhaustive, with what is perhaps the most popular conception of privacy in 
law. In the influential article titled “The Right to Privacy,” published in 1890, 
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis state: “It is our purpose to consider whether 
the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the 
privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such 
protection is” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). In exploring past case law to define 
privacy, Warren and Brandeis point to a “right to be let alone” (Warren & 
Brandeis, 1890). Warren and Brandeis conclude, "the principle which protects 
personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or the emotions, is 
the right to privacy" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). While the “right to be let alone” 
may be the foundation of privacy law, and may fit within the construct of the 
public-private dichotomy defined by the courts, it fails to address the new 
challenges brought about by emerging technologies.  For example, the “right to 
be let alone” may take into account concerns over surveillance technologies, but 
it does not consider government transparency in posting Federally funded 
research, or access to public health registries to promote research, examples I will 
discuss later.  
REIMAGINING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY IN HEALTH POLICY 
Privacy cannot be discussed in isolation, for it is the context in which 
privacy is situated that determines the values at stake, and thus, the morally 
appropriate course of action to take when considering trade-offs to privacy. 
Privacy as an abstract concept is unhelpful when the stakes are high, as they are 
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in health care and in health policy. In the health care space, violations of privacy 
can lead to devastating consequences, such as denial of health insurance 
coverage, debilitating fees, and loss of agency. Invoking privacy is not sufficient 
to protect what ought to be protected, nor is it sufficient to identify what ought 
not be protected. By invoking privacy without context, policy makers risk 
painting the situation at hand with too broad a brush, failing to protect or 
promote actual values at stake, while limiting the effectiveness of an initiative 
due to too many unnecessary restrictions.  
Privacy will continue to evolve as new technologies are introduced, and as 
new initiatives take hold, resulting in even more conceptions of privacy than 
currently exist. The problem with many conceptions of privacy becomes 
apparent when we invoke privacy, but fail to understand someone else’s 
understanding of privacy. For example, privacy can be defined as the control of 
information or the “right to be let alone.” If accessing health data is the goal of an 
initiative, privacy defined as the control of information lends itself to different 
opportunities for trade-offs than if privacy is defined as the “right to be let 
alone.” For instance, the initiative may choose to de-identify all health data 
submitted in order to protect individuals from being contacted by researchers 
who would like to study their data or ask for additional health data. The 
initiative would be appealing to the individual’s right to be let alone, even at the 
risk of hindering scientific breakthroughs. On the other hand, if privacy 
requirements are fulfilled by individuals controlling their own information, some 
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identifiable information may be tied to their health data so that researchers could 
reach out for follow-ups; at the very least, there would be a mechanism in place 
to reach these individuals should researchers express interest in engaging with 
their data. The justifications provided for trading off an individual’s privacy for 
access to their health data must be more compelling in the former case because 
the individual has a stronger claim to their privacy (as the right to be left alone). 
If privacy is defined as the control of personal information, then contacting the 
individual before engaging with their health data is acceptable, if not required. 
Policies will be shaped by how strong a claim individuals have to privacy. 
Hence, clarifying the context, or circumstances, becomes a vital first step prior to 
recommending policies that protect privacy in a given situation.  
Privacy has and will continue to change, so we must be able to identify 
these changes and analyze what values are at stake in light of these changes. As 
previously discussed, Western conceptions of privacy have been shaped by case 
law; societal norms have also played a role in shaping these conceptions. Helen 
Nissenbaum’s framework of contextual integrity seeks to provide a metric from 
which changes in societal norms can be measured. She states that contextual 
integrity “is preserved when informational norms are respected and violated 
when informational norms are breached” (Nissenbaum, 2009). Nissenbaum goes 
on to explain that these informational norms are characterized by: (1) contexts, 
which include roles, power structures, norms, and values, (2) actors, (3) 
attributes, and (4) transmission principles, or to whom or where information is 
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now shared as a result of a change in practice. In creating this framework, 
Nissenbaum helps us two-fold. First, contextual integrity helps us identify 
deviations from the norm, and thus, helps us predict if and when new 
technologies, policies, or initiatives are disruptive. Second, contextual integrity 
can help us understand why this disruption will or has occurred by breaking 
down the many factors that play into a change in the status quo. By anticipating 
and understanding anxieties felt by stakeholders (those who have vested interest 
in an activity), policy makers can work to temper concerns as a result of 
disruptive changes by recommending policies that address stakeholder concerns, 
while simultaneously promoting the values espoused in an activity’s mission 
statement and societally-held values.  
In its current state, the policy making process follows the principles of 
contextual integrity to a degree. That is, policy makers are tasked with 
understanding the current narrative surrounding existing technologies and the 
potential impact of new or repurposed technologies. For example, before 
regulations are approved by the Office of Management and Budget, they 
undergo an economic impact analysis in order to estimate their impact on the 
American economy; the analysis prescribed by Circular A-4 is regimented and 
standard to all regulations (Office of Management and Budget, 2003). Policy 
makers are tasked with creating implementation scenarios that take into account 
anticipated stakeholder reactions, existing standards and norms in the industry, 
missing gaps that can be addressed by a new regulation, and ultimately, are 
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tasked with proposing an option that will be the least disruptive while still being 
the most effective in accomplishing the goals of the Administration. Although 
the components of the contextual integrity framework exist, policy making is 
more art than science. There is no formula that policy makers can apply to a 
situation that will result in the best outcome; a good deal of judgment is at play. 
Contextual integrity can help policy makers think about policies in a more 
regimented way, thereby increasing the likelihood that all possible sticking 
points are considered.  
Contextual integrity has its limitations, however, as Nissenbaum is first to 
admit.  It is very similar to the concept of reasonable expectation that is used in 
the courts. For example, when I am out in public I know that other people see 
me. I do not mind being seen by others because I have the reasonable belief that I 
will be forgotten. That is, even if others see me, they are most likely to forget me 
immediately and move on. The introduction of cameras on every street corner 
was disruptive to this reasonable expectation of being forgotten. Now, as I walk 
down the street, I am aware that while other people will forget me, there are 
cameras that will record me. The reason that society has accepted this disruption 
of the norms is because cameras add at least the perception of safety, if not 
demonstrable increases in safety. It is understood that these cameras help police 
officers do their jobs better. If someone has gone missing, street cameras are used 
to identify when they were last seen in public. If there has been a hit and run, 
street cameras can help identify the perpetrator. The trade-off of having our 
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reasonable expectation of being forgotten infringed upon is a society that is 
better able to respond in cases of wrong doing in public spaces. Reasonable 
expectation, like contextual integrity, is based on current societal norms. So while 
helpful in identifying deviations from these norms, it is not helpful is making 
value judgments about these deviations. Just because something deviates from 
the norm, or violates contextual integrity, does not mean it is less aligned with 
our values as a society. In fact, a deviation from the norm may be necessary to 
get us closer to realizing our values.  
Merely recognizing that new events or initiatives disrupt privacy norms is 
not sufficient. Privacy is multifaceted, as evinced by the many conceptions of it 
that exist. Common to these conceptions of privacy, however, is the notion that 
privacy is inherently good and must be protected or promoted. Often, at least in 
informational privacy, it is the value against which other values are assessed, 
and the value that is necessarily infringed upon when trade-offs are made. For 
example, there is still a contentious debate surrounding the disclosure of a 
patient’s HIV status to their partners. Although there have been trade-offs made 
in promoting public health to the detriment of personal privacy, such as the 
requirement for doctors to report certain infections to public health registries, the 
HIV disclosure debate illustrates how current these conversations still are. At 
least in this case, it is debatable whether public health trumps the right to privacy 
over personal medical information.   
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Privacy is not always good, however. In the context of informational 
privacy, control of information can be good or bad, as I will explain later through 
an example involving open source data. This observation brings me to the vital 
second step of understanding privacy. Again, the first step is to understand the 
context, which can be done diligently through the contextual integrity 
framework. The second step of understanding privacy is deciding if privacy is 
promoting a good within a given context. If privacy is value neutral, then it is not 
worth promoting at the expense of competing values.  If privacy is working 
against values that are held by society, steps must be taken to mitigate privacy’s 
negative influence.  
Some critics argue that privacy itself does not change, but society’s 
tolerance for privacy violations changes. As people become more comfortable 
with a new normal of privacy, they amend their understanding of a perceived 
loss of privacy to reflect this new normal. In the context of health, medical 
records have become digitized; this reflects a change in the state of affairs that 
people have not explicitly consented to. Rather, institutions deemed a transition 
to electronic records necessary, and users of the health care system have been 
required to adapt to the new normal. Yes, it seems that tolerance has changed. 
This change is especially evident in younger generations in their apparent 
disregard of privacy as they contribute to social media websites and use mobile 
applications to stream music, order delivery, and hail a cab. In contrast, older 
generations may resist these technologies because they never normalized their 
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use; those adventurous enough to join Facebook, for example, may first seek 
advice or assistance from children and grandchildren. Even institutional 
interpretations of privacy have changed, even though the Supreme Court uses 
the same source material to review cases.  
Tolerance has changed our relationship to privacy, but I reject that it is the 
sole driver of this change. Through tolerance of new technologies or approaches, 
we may be willing to accept changes counter to our beliefs, values, or habits in 
favor of a desirable outcome; or we may simply be resigned to a new state of 
affairs.4 To tolerate something is to accept it begrudgingly, to embrace something 
is to accept it enthusiastically. Embracing a new technology or approach means 
that we willingly seek out these changes, integrate them into our lives, and 
implore others to consider doing the same. In the context of online banking, I can 
tolerate the move from paper statements to electronic statements by not 
complaining to my bank when the change occurs, or by not asking that my bank 
continue paper statements in lieu of electronic. Or, I can embrace online banking 
and, in addition to receiving electronic statements, set up payment alerts through 
my mobile application and cash checks without ever stepping foot into a bank.  
                                                        
4 Due to regulatory requirements, clinicians and hospitals must use electronic health record 
technology in lieu of paper records. People must tolerate this change to receive health care in the 
United States since there is no going back to paper records. Similarly, our use of credit cards is 
changing. Due to recent regulations, merchants must adopt credit card chip readers lest they be held 
accountable for fraudulent charges (rather than credit card companies). United States merchants 
currently accept signatures and chips with signatures; many other countries require a chip and a 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) (Newman, 2016). 
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People are becoming more comfortable using social media, online dating 
and shopping, and using applications that gather information, including health 
information (e.g., FitBit). In fact, people are seeking out these services because 
they make life better in some way. Rather than wait in line at a fast food 
restaurant, I can order ahead on a mobile application and pick up my order at 
the counter; the trade-off for my privacy is more time to do something else. 
Sometimes I prefer traditional sit-down restaurant food, but do not want to leave 
the house. Restaurants typically do not deliver, but there is an “app” for that. I 
can order sit-down restaurant food through a third-party application and tip 
someone to wait for my food and deliver it to me; the trade-off for disclosing my 
address to a stranger is convenience.  
Institutions play a large role in ensuring our relationships with technology 
remain positive, despite the reality of less privacy. For instance, I am more likely 
to use my credit card to make purchases online if my credit card company 
protects me from fraud, or reimburses me when fraud has occurred. Having 
institutional protections in place allows me to enjoy the benefits of technology 
without having to be overwhelmingly concerned about the loss of my privacy.  
As a society, we are embracing new norms for new trade-offs. As each 
new technology is introduced, there are corresponding pros and cons to 
adopting the technology. Younger generations are generally early adopters of 
new technologies, embracing the benefits of social media (staying in touch with 
friends), online shopping (not having to leave the house to buy goods), and 
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mobile applications despite the trade-offs to their privacy. Older generations 
may be reluctant to participate in these technologies because they prioritize 
privacy. While older generations may be concerned by younger generations’ 
cavalier attitude toward individual privacy, younger generations may view older 
generations’ reluctance to accept trade-offs to individual privacy as 
unnecessarily uptight – a relic of an outdated way of thinking and a failure to 
embrace new norms. Because younger generations worry about privacy less, 
they have access to certain goods and services that remain untapped by those 
who are reluctant to make the trade.  
CASE STUDIES 
The Precision Medicine Initiative 
Establishing a statistically significant and representative database for 
research purposes has the potential to further public health.  The Precision 
Medicine Initiative’s (PMI) long-term objective is to help researchers better 
understand and assess disease risk, mechanisms, and therapies (Collins & 
Varmus, 2015). Advances in bioinformatics and information technology have 
enabled researchers to analyze and store incredible amounts of data. Data 
scientists aspire to extract information from millions of individuals in order to 
generate algorithms that will help predict clinical needs for each patient. Not 
only does this approach have clinical significance for individuals, it also will 
allow health care institutions to better predict and plan for the health needs of 
25 
 
the communities they serve (Hood & Friend, 2011). Moreover, scientists may be 
able to predict the health burden of a community and plan educational, 
environmental, or policy interventions (Hood & Friend, 2011). Large sample 
sizes are integral to assessing public health-level need. In order to achieve the 
aforementioned, active participation by the PMI cohort is essential; thus, the PMI 
endeavors to “pioneer new models for doing science that emphasize engaged 
participants and open, responsible data sharing” (National Institutes of Health, 
2015). To that end, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis 
Collins, tasked the PMI Working Group with developing a blueprint for the 
design and execution of the PMI Cohort Program (PMI-CP). The PMI Working 
Group released “The Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program – Building a 
Research Foundation for 21st Century Medicine” on September 15, 2015, a 100 
page document that explored the many facets of PMI, including data privacy. 
The Working Group made the following recommendations to protect data 
privacy:  
Recommendation 5.31: The PMI-CP should create and use de-identified 
data for research whenever feasible to do so. 
Recommendation 5.32: The PMI-CP should engage data privacy experts 
to create an effective combination of technology and policy to minimize 
risks of re-identification of de-identified data. 
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Recommendation 5.33: The PMI-CP should develop educational materials 
for participants that explain the principles of data privacy, its limitations, 
and their role in helping to maintain it. 
Recommendation 5.34: The PMI-CP should have a clearly articulated plan 
in case of a privacy breach, which includes notification to participants. 
(Precision Medicine Initiative Working Group, 2015) 
 
 From these recommendations, it appears that privacy is at odds with data 
sharing, especially when it comes to potentially re-identifiable health 
information. These recommendations point to three specific privacy goals: (1) de-
identification, (2) restricted access, and (3) notifying affected parties in the event 
of a data hack or breach. The Working Group specifically asks policy makers to 
create policies that minimize the risks of data re-identification. At face value, this 
is a vague request. The PMI Working Group acknowledges that de-identified 
data is re-identifiable as a result of the mission of PMI. Collecting as many data 
points as PMI strives to collect for the purposes of research has consequences; 
these data can be cross-referenced to publicly available data, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that individuals can be identified. Moreover, PMI will collect 
genetic information, which may be identifiable based on rare markers. Also, 
consider that researchers will have to reach out to individuals for consent if they 
seek to assemble smaller cohorts, such as those with a rare disease phenotype; 
researchers engaging in broader studies can use de-identified data, as there will 
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likely be a provision that gives broad consent to researchers to study de-
identified data.  
From the concerns articulated by the PMI Working Group, it seems 
inevitable that data will be re-identified, but it is what happens after the fact that 
will matter most to participants. The PMI-CP is voluntary. It is likely that those 
participating in the program do not mind sharing their information in the name 
of science. Instead, participants are likely more concerned with what happens to 
their health data outside of the research setting, as they have only consented to 
their data being used in the research setting. Despite the seeming inevitability of 
re-identification, intentional or otherwise, the PMI Working Group continues to 
recommend de-identifying data as a means of protecting information from 
nefarious parties. As a way of reducing the risk of de-identification, the PMI 
Working Group has recommended that the PMI-CP “discourage data from being 
copied outside the PMI secure computing environment, while allowing outside 
data to be imported into the PMI cohort computing environment” (Precision 
Medicine Initiative Working Group, 2015). By maintaining data in a secure 
computing environment, the PMI Working Group believes there is less chance of 
re-identification, and thus, a reduced likelihood that identifiable data will be 
distributed. While this approach seems reasonable at first glance, it is 
shortsighted and does not adequately address the concern of re-identified data 
falling into the wrong hands. Rather than developing a policy to discourage data 
exports, a more effective policy that gets to the root of participant anxiety is this: 
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Access to data will be restricted to authorized personnel only and will only be 
used for authorized purposes; the sale of data to third parties is prohibited. 
Clarifying their values, the White House released the “Precision Medicine 
Initiative: Privacy and Trust Principles,” which included the following guidance: 
“Data access, use, and sharing should be permitted for authorized purposes only. 
Certain activities should be expressly prohibited, including sale or use of the data 
for targeted advertising” (The White House, 2015). Based on the two guidance 
documents discussed here, it is clear that privacy, in the context of PMI, points to 
a particular value: the right to not be used to make a profit. What violates 
privacy in this case, is not re-identifiable data, but third parties using data 
collected by PMI to make a profit at our expense. Protecting privacy within the 
context of PMI promotes a good, the right to not be used to make a profit, and 
furthers the interests of PMI, which is to promote research that benefits public 
health without causing undue burden to participants.  
Open Data and the Environmental Protection Agency 
 This next example offers a look at privacy working as a negative influence 
in the pursuit of values that promote transparency, community engagement, and 
creativity. That is, by appealing to privacy, specifically understood as the control 
of information, we are not promoting values that society finds important and 
worth protecting. Open data is information freely available to anyone who can 
access it. The idea behind open data in government is to provide constituents 
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with data collected by agencies so that they may in turn analyze the data and 
come up with novel solutions to address challenges faced in the United States 
and abroad. In short, two (or many) heads are better than one. Another goal of 
open data is transparency; the Obama Administration created 
https://open.whitehouse.gov for this purpose, though they also encouraged and 
hosted “hackathons,” events that bring together computer programmers to solve 
challenges using open data sets (The White House, 2013).  
 Recently, the Trump Administration has come under fire for its lack of 
transparency, a value that was held by the former administration (The White 
House, 2013). The evidence for this enduring value is clear, even constrained 
within government: constituents calling for public officials to release tax returns 
to highlight conflicts of interests, requiring that public employee salaries be 
accessible to the public, preserving all Presidential and Vice Presidential records, 
and allowing the public to request access to government records, codified by the 
Freedom of Information Act.  
Prior to President Trump’s inauguration, the following headlines were 
plastered across the Internet: “Scientists are frantically copying U.S. climate data, 
fearing it might vanish under Trump” (Washington Post), “Rogue Scientists Race 
to Save Climate Data from Trump” (Wired), and “Why is federal government 
data disappearing?” (The Hill). Initially, these outcries were seen as 
overreactions, but nevertheless, computer programmers held events to save as 
much publicly available data as possible, and reportedly, federally employed 
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scientists scrambled to back up climate data in the last days of the Obama 
Administration (Eilperin, Rein, & Fisher, 2017). These actions were not remiss, it 
seems, as the Trump Administration has been noticeably antagonistic towards 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), even nominating Scott Pruitt as 
Administrator (it is worth noting here that Administrator Pruitt has sued the 
EPA many times, and at one point, championed its elimination as an agency). 
Shockingly, the Trump Administration issued a gag order for government 
agencies, such as the National Parks Service, and a media blackout for the EPA 
(Rott, 2017). The scientific community immediately noticed that open data sets 
had been removed from the open data website established by former President 
Obama, leaving only a blank template for promoting transparency. The open 
data sets are still preserved on the archived White House site, a requirement of 
the Presidential Records Act that does not allow Presidential records to be 
deleted, but they are stored in difficult to read formats.  
During Presidential transitions, the new Administration is given leeway to 
reorganize information and content on White House websites to reflect 
Administration priorities. Many associated pages and links have been deleted 
because they do not reflect Administration priorities, which is the prerogative of 
any new Administration. The Federal Government, to a degree, gets to decide 
what it shares with the public. In this sense, the Federal Government is 
protecting its privacy by controlling the flow of information that it manages. The 
right to privacy is not limited to individuals; it also includes groups, companies, 
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and governments. For example, companies are allowed to have trade secrets. The 
Coca-Cola Company’s recipe is a trade secret, which means that the company 
will never have to disclose the famous Coca-Cola recipe to the market; patent 
protections, on the other hand, would require that the recipe be disclosed in 20 
years. It comes to no surprise that governments have secrets as well. Security 
clearance is required for national security positions, and disclosure of these 
secrets is called treason.  There are whistleblower protections in place, however, 
so that Federal employees can report agency misconduct without fear of 
retaliation.  
So it seems that government actions that promote privacy for the 
government work against values that the American people value, namely, 
transparency and access to federally funded research (i.e., taxpayer funded 
research). The control of information can be good in cases of protecting medical 
information from insurers so that insurance premiums do not rise, but bad in 
terms of the government promoting transparency in federally funded research 
and establishing trust with its constituents. Context matters, and the value we 
place on privacy matters. 
ACCEPTABLE TRADE-OFFS TO PRESERVE THE MOST IMPORTANT 
VALUES 
We must be careful of assigning blanket legal protections to privacy. 
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Simply basing decisions on the need to protect privacy does not get to the root 
cause of concerns felt by society, such as appropriate access to information, 
knowing how information will be used, and knowing when information is being 
collected. By painting too broad a brush with policies that point to protecting 
privacy, we may wrongly protect what ought not to be protected, as in the case 
of health data for the purposes of research. In doing so, we risk stagnating 
progress, as discussed in the Precision Medicine case study. PMI seeks to 
transform how medicine is practiced in the United States, shifting health care 
from reactive to preventative. This transformation, if successful, will have an 
enormous impact on the quality of life for Americans, will overhaul the 
American health care economy, and will contribute to the scientific literature. By 
simply aiming to protect privacy, we lack the precision to identify real causes for 
concern in the PMI. For example, de-identifying all data to protect participant 
privacy is likely going a step too far if the real concern for PMI participants is 
that their data may end up in the wrong hands (e.g., insurance companies). 
Instead, a more nuanced approach may yield policies that require researchers to 
seek permission from an institutional review board before acquiring identifiable 
data for use in research studies.  
Without a more nuanced approach to tackling disruptive technologies and 
endeavors, we may also fail to acknowledge what must be protected. For 
example, seemingly innocuous open databases may result in harassment and 
stalking of individuals, such as in the case of public driving license databases. 
33 
 
Had policy makers taken into account the political and social landscape of the 
time, they may have predicted that anti-abortion activists and women who had 
received abortions would be targeted by groups seeking to do them harm. In 
another example presented by the open data and EPA case, respecting an 
institution’s privacy may have debilitating effects on innovation. Privacy should 
not be seen as value neutral or positive in all circumstances. It is important to 
evaluate the value of privacy within context, determining privacy’s positive or 
negative influence based on its impact on other values that are worth protecting. 
In this case, respecting institutional privacy contributes to a lack of transparency, 
especially in the context of federally funded research – research that should 
ideally be accessible to everyone since the public funds it.  
Despite knee-jerk concerns, we are willing to trade individual entitlements 
to privacy for other pursuits that are important to us, such as public health and 
access to federally funded research on climate change. Public opinion regarding 
acceptable invasions of privacy waxes and wanes; 9/11 prompted a desire to 
increase surveillance in the name of fighting terrorism. The USA PATRIOT Act 
was signed into law 45 days after 9/11, beginning a string of policies that 
increased government surveillance. We became resigned to taking off our shoes 
at airports and submitting to invasive full body scans, all in the pursuit of 
national security, and in turn, our personal safety. A decade later, the National 
Security Agency documents leaked by Edward Snowden exposed a different 
public opinion. People were outraged by the scope of surveillance by the 
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government, suggesting that there are limitations to encroaching upon privacy 
for the sake of combating terrorism. This shift in public opinion was once again 
reflected in Apple’s legal battle with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
refusing to create a “backdoor” that unlocks all iPhones (for criminal and 
terrorist cases); Apple stated: “We believe security shouldn’t come at the expense 
of individual privacy” (Apple, 2016). Apple may have overstated the case for 
privacy protections, especially since we trade privacy for security in many 
contexts; thus, we may more reasonably state that security should not come at 
too great an expense of individual privacy.  
In the context of information sharing, health information is both shared 
and withheld. Individual privacy between patient and physician in the clinical 
context does not exist once the patient willingly discloses medical information– 
information is shared between clinicians, technicians, and labs in order to 
promote the patient’s health. Perhaps this expanded notion of the health care 
team can include informaticists and researchers for, in the context of precision 
medicine, they are promoting the health of the patient. Doctors are required to 
submit infectious disease data to registries in order to protect public health at the 
expense of their patient’s anonymity. Physicians have access to Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that allow them to look up “doctor 
shoppers,” or patients who visit multiple doctors in the hopes of getting 
prescribed opioid painkillers; at least in Oregon, access has been expanded to 
include pharmacists and police officers with a warrant (McCarty, et al., 2015).  
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Contact tracing is another example of elevating public interests over individual 
privacy, even if the case in question does not have widespread public health 
consequences. Mental health information must be reported to authorities in cases 
where there is risk of harm to another person. On the other hand, while allowing 
patient access to health records is required of health care providers, mental 
health information can be kept from patients to prevent psychological harm. 
 Trade-offs are driven by (1) circumstance, such as in the wake of 
9/11 and in light of new technologies, (2) comfort and ease, such as through 
online shopping, and (3) expectation, because society has adopted new methods, 
as in the adoption of electronic medical records. Privacy is a value that is 
sometimes trumped by other values in the form of trade-offs. If policy makers 
can better predict the tensions that require consideration in the context of these 
trade-offs, they are better positioned to develop more effective policies that 
accomplish goals without unduly burdening members of society. At the very 
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